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Nation－Building　alld　Political　Struggle（1）：
　　　　　　　　　　　Kuomintang’s　China
Michimi　MURANUSHI
　　First，　this　paper　analyzes　the　interactions　between　the　KMT（Kuo－
mintang）and　the　CCP（Chinese　Communist　Party＞　by　focusing　on
the　political　strategies　of　these　two　actors　between　the　First　United
Front　and　the　start　of　the　Sino－Japanese　waL　Second，　this　paper　seeks
to　de血ne　the　politica1　conditions　necessary　for　precipitating　a　commu－
nist　revolution　in　a　certain　type　of　countries．
1．　Introduction
　　Aquestio獄in　the　po藪tical　development　of　the　Third　World　is　how　a
new，　non－communist　govemment重s　able　to　overcome　traditional
powers，　fbreign　interference，　and　a　revolutionary　communist　move－
ment　simultaneously．　The　communist　revolutions　i簸Chilla，　South
Vietnam，　Laos，　and　Cambodia，　share　a　certain　set　of　conditions：weak
control　by　the　state，　disunity　among　govemment　leaders，　tenuous
financial　supPort，　inte血se　urban　nationalism，　social　grievances，　civil
wars，　fbfeign　intervention，　the　decay　of　the　government，　and　an　abrupt
cut　in　fbreign　assistance．
　　One　has　to　ask　why　some　llations　that　achieved　independence　after
World　War　II　were　eventually　taken　over　by　a　communist　party．
Sometimes　a　non－communist　govemment　becomes　increasi益91y　vulner－
able　to　communist　movements．　There　may　be　a　causal　link　between　the
possibility　of　a　communist　revolut孟o鍛and龍ation－building．
　　Nation．building　is　a　process　in　which（i）nationalism　grows，　and（ii）
agovernment　expands　its　control　over　people　and　regions，　defeating
traditional　powers．　In　this　process，　individuals　who　used　to　obey
different　powers　are　integrated　i就o　a　single　political　unit．　Many　Third
World　governments　face　the　foilowi皿g　complex　set　of　conitions．
　　First，　most　of　them　have　feuda1　or　semi－f6udal　iegacies．　By‘‘feuda豆，’
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or‘‘semi－feudal，’Imean　a　high　degree　of　decentralization。　Third
World　countr重es　must　achieve　both　the　bourgeois　revolution　and　the
centralization　of　political　and　economic　power　at　the　same　time．　They
have　to　replace　traditio皿al　social　authorities，　such　as　cla！1s，　cliques，　or
warlords，　by　a　central　government．　And　at　the　same　time　they　have　to
replace　loca1童delltity　by　national　identity．　The　govemment　must
reorganize　a　society　so　that　no　regional　actors　are　outside　the　control　of
its　decision．
　　Second，　non－communist　Third　World　govemments　have　to血ght　in
two　different　dimensions．　One　is　defined　by　the　ideals　of　liberal
democracy，　such　as　political　participation，　rule　of　law，　and　freedom　of
express藍on．　The　other　is　the　policies　of　commu塁ism，　such　as　united
front，　propaganda，　indoctrination，　and　democratic　centralism．
　　If　a　Third　World　country　is　lenient　to　a　communist　party　in　order　to
achieve　democratic　ideals，　tllell　the　communist　party　may　organize　all
social　forces　to　overthrow　that　government．　If　it　supPresses　a　commnist
party　and　its　sympathizers，　then　students　alld　in専ell㏄tuals　begill　to
doubt　the　legitimacy　of　the　govemment，　because　in　their　minds　legiti－
macy　is　the　question　of　what　a　govemment　should　be．　People　do　not
necessarily　calculate　in　advance　that　the　government　can　afford．　Third
World　govemments　must　strike　a　balance　between　tolerance　and　op－
　　　　　presslon・
　　The　third　is　the　expansion　of　the　govemment，s　obligat量on　to　citizens．
What　used　to　belong　to　a　vinage　or　a　traditional　power，　such　as　social
insurance　against　poor　harvest，　or　protection　from　local　band垂ts，
become　the　responsibility　of　the　government．　The　failure　to　fuMll　such
obhgations　is　likely　to　discredit　the　legitimacy　of　the　govemment。　This
weakend　legitimacy　of　the　existing　govemment　in　tum　produces　oppor・
tun藍t孟es　that　colnmunist　movements　may　take　advantage　of．　Because
when　people　destroy　the　old，　they　usuany　assume　that　what　will　follow
win　be　better．　Third　World　governments　must　therefore　try　to　narrow
tha　gap　between　what　people　expect　and　what　the　government　can　do．
　　The　f（）urth　is　the　infiuence　of　indusUially　advanced　foreign　countries．
Even　when　the　govemment　is　able　to　cope　with　the　above　problems，
fbreig烈cou薮tries　with　advallced　econo血c　and　military　capacities　may
intervene　to　disrupt，　distort，　or　pr㏄ipitate　the　nation－bu逓ding　Process
64
fbr　their　own　interests．　Third　World　govemments　must　ut皿ize　ad－
vanced　fbreign　countries　fbr　their　own　domestic　political　benefit　with－
out　being　used　by　the　fbreign　countries．
　　The　fifth　is　coalition－1）uilding．　Since　no　political　actor　in　a　Third
World　country　is　predominantly　strong，　each　actonnust　form　an
alliance　with　some　other　actors　to　fight　against　the　rest．　The　key
question　is　whom　to　ally　with丘rst，　whom　to　ally　with　second，　whom　to
betray且rst，　and　whom　to　betray　second．　Today’s　friends　may　be
tolnorrow’s　enemies．　Today’s　e聡emies　may　be　tomorow’s　friends．
　　No　Westem　country　ever　faced　the　above　combination　of　nat三〇n－
building，　commullist　challenge，　having　to，live　up　to　the三deals　of　hberal
democracy，　the　obligation　of　tlle　state，　foreign　in且uellce，　and　coalition
building　at　the　same　time．　Bismarck　cou韮d　suppress　dissidents　without
being　accused　of　being　no11－democratic．　He　could　defeat　his　political
enemies　without　worryillg　about　how　much　fbreign　cou11面es　assisted
him　or　his　enemies．　He　could　tackle　social　problems　one　by　one，
w童thout　worry量ng　about　a　communist　party．
　　In　the　Third　World，　governments　face　too　many　demands　and　too
many　enemies．　How　is　it　possible　fbr　a　new　non・communist　govem－
ment　to　manage　the　above　set　of　problems，　without　a　communist
revolution？This藍s　the　question　I　am　about　to　explore，　drawing　on　the
experiences　of　the　KMT’s　China．
II．　Concept　of　Revolution
●
1
　　Revolution　is　a　notion　that　is　yet　to　have　a　dgorous　definition．
According　to　Hungtington，‘‘a　revolution　is　a　rapid，　fUndamenta1，　and
violent　domestic　change　in　the　dominant　values　and　myths　of　a　society，
’　　　　　　mlts　political　institutions，　social　structure，1eadership，　a聡d　govemment
activities　and　po血cies．”且According　to　Skocpo韮，‘‘social　revolution　is　a
rapid，　basic　transfb】mlation　of　a　s㏄iety，s　state　and　class　structures，
accompanied　by　class－based　revolts　from　below．”2
　L　Samuel　Hungtington，　Political　Ordeアin伽πg’麗g＆te勧ies　p．264．
　2．　Theda　Skocpo1，　State　and　Social　Reり01麗診め灘Chapter　I．
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　　1　find　both　de丘nitions　defective　because　of　the　vagueness　of　the　terms
‘‘?浮獅р≠高?獅狽≠o　or‘‘basic”．　These　are　both　su切ective　temls．　It　is　often
debatable　what　has　actually　changed　after　a　revolution．　Besides，　when
there　seems　to　be　a“fUndamentar’change，　the　change　may　not　be
durable．　A　revolution　may　be　upset　soon　by　a　counte1Tevolution．　Even
when　the　same　group　rules　after　the　takeover　of　state　power，　the　old
system　may　quietly　replace　the　new　under　a　different　name．　A　revolu－
t童on　must　be　de伽ed　not　in　terms　of　actual　cllange　in　a　social　system　but
in　terms　of　the　termination　of　power　struggle，　and　the　illitial　intention
of　its　winner．
　　In　this　paper，　I　de丘ne　revolution　as　a　violent　takeover　of　the　state　by
agroup　which　believes　in　the　reorgan量zation　of　society．　What　dis－
tinguishes　a　revolution　from　other　political　process　is　that　the　power　is
violently　taken　away　from　an　existing　govemment　by　another　group
wh壼ch　demands－but　not　necessarily　successfully－the　reorganization
of　society．　This　def董nition　is　strict　enough　to　distinguish　revolutions
from　co叩s．
　　Here，　the　new　group　in　power　is　not　necessarily　based　on　a　class．　It
may　well　be　a　group　of　elites　who　simply　want　to　utilize　social　classes
fbr　their　own　advantage．　Moreover，　according　to　my　de掘tion，　a
revolution　does　not　necessarily　mean　that　there　was　an　actual　sociaI
change　after　the　takeover　of　power．　It　simply　means　that　the　power　was
violently　replaced　by　a　group　calling　for　a　transformation．　Whether　the
proclamation　is　put　into　practice　does　not　matter．
　　Acommunist　revolution　is　a　revolution　by　a　communist　party．　Hefe
acomlnu紅ist　party　is　simply　the　name　of　a　group　with　a　set　of　attributes
such　as　Marx童st－Leninist　belief．　What“true”communism　is　not　an
issue　here．
　　An　important　question量s　the　relation　between　power　struggle　and
social　policies．　My　de価tion　of　a　communist　revolutio簸is　neutral　to
whether（i）acommunist　party　takes　power　in　order　to　put　i級to
existence　the　ideal　society，　or（ii）acommunist　party　uses　the　image　of
the　ideal　society　fbr　the　sake　of　gettillg　and　maintailling　political　power．
According　to　the負rst　view，　a　communist　party　is　a　group　of　altmists
who　devote　their　lives　to　the　creation　of　an　ideal　society．　According　to
the　second　view，　a　commun孟st　party　is　a　group　of　hypoc擁tes　whQ　hide
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tlleir　thirst　for　power　with　beautiful　slogans．
III．　Political　Actors
　　It孟s　possible　to　classifンpolitical　actors　in　a　no11－communist　Third
World　country　in　the　fbnowing　way．
　　A：
　　B：
　　C：
ation】
　　D：
　　E：
govemment【the　KMT］
communist　party［the　CCP】
non－commu勲ist　opposition　groups［e．g．　the　National　Salvation　Ass㏄i一
traditional　pOwers［warlords，　landlords，　bandits】
foreign　countries［the　US，　the　USSR，　the　UK，　Germany，　France，
Japan】
　　F：　the‘‘people，，・【countryside（gentry，　peasa双ts），　urba血（proleta㎡at，　stu－
dents，　intellectuals）】or【active，　apathetic】
　　Since　the　start　ofthe　Northem　Expeditio皿，　the　KMT　tried　to　expand
its　terdtorial　colltrol　over　entire　China．　The　CCP　cooperated　with　the
KMT　in　the　fbm　of　the　First　United　Front　fbr　a　while．　But　neither　the
KMT　nor　the　CCP　thought　that　their　cooperation　was　lasthlg．　The
clearest　evidence　is　Chiang　Kai－shek’s　suppression　of　co㎜血s的in
Shanghai　on　Apri112，1927．
Non－co㎜unist　oPPosition　groups　were　rather　weak　d囲ng　the　No曲一
em　Expedition．　But　a負er　the　Mukden　incident　of　September　1931，
students　a無d　intellectuals　in　urban　areas　began　to　create　anti，Japanese
movements　in　the　form　of　the　National　Salvation　Associations．　The
movements　were　not　necessarily　sympathetic　to　commullism，　but　oPP－
oses　Chiang，s　lenient　attitude　toward　the　Kwantung　Amy．
　　Moreover，　there　were　warlords　with　semi－fbudal　characteristics．
What　they　are　most　interested　in　is　their　personal　wealth　which　they
accumulate　through　the　exploitation　of　peasa夏ts　or　through　opportuni－
stic　wars．　In　close　connection　w孟th　these　warlords　were　fbreig登powers，
such　as　the　UK，　the　US，　Japan，　Fra簸ce，　Germany，　a灘d　the　USSR．　In
addition　to　the　above，　there　was‘‘the　people”classi血ed　i蹴several　ways．
In　tems　of　political　consciousness，　some　are　politically　active，　but　most
were　apathetic．
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IV．　Dimensions
1．　OrganiZational　Strength
　　‘‘Organizational　strength”may　be　a　useful　concept．　This　is　essentia1－
1y　a　degree　to　which　the　highest　decision－maker　of　a　political　organiza－
tion　can　make　his　subordinates　do　something　which　otherw童se　they
would　not．　Every　political　actor　described　above　is　actually　a　group　of
people．　What　matters　is　a　degree　to　which　sub－1eaders　of　a　political
organizat三〇n　follow　the且nal　decision　of　the　top　leader．　The　top　leader
may　not　be　able　to　implement　his　decision，　One　may　be　able　to　divide
political　actors　into‘‘organizat三〇nally　strong”actors，　such　as　the　CCP，
and“organizationally　weak”actors，　such　as　the　KMT。
　　In　most　non－columunist　Third　World　countries，　the　govemment　is
usually　organizationally　weak　and　a　communist　party孟s　organizationa－
11y　strong．　The　government　often　faced　coup－attempts．　Corruptlon　was
rampant．　In　the　case　of　China　befbre　1949，　the　a｛ljectives　most　often
used　to　describe　the　KMT　were“factiona1”and‘‘compt”．　Chiang
Kai－shek，　who　himself　established　his　position　in　the　KMT　through　a
coup，　faced　a　number　of　rebellions．
　　In　contrast，　a　communist　party　usually　has　the　iron　rule　of　democrat－
ic　centralism．　Namely，　problems　are　a　rediscussed　until　a　decision　is
reached・but　once　the　final　decision　is　reached　it　must　be　obeyed　at　any
cost．　Of　course　there　are　exceptions，　such　as　Mao’s　disobedience　to　Li
h－San，S　Strategy・But　in　cOmpariSOn　With　a　gOVernment，　a　COmmuniSt
party　is　much　more　cohesive　and　its　cohesion　is　durable．
2．　F血a皿cial　Base
　　The　other　organizational　character　is　the　diversification　of　financial
bases．　Every　actor　must　have　some五nancial　base．　The　more　you　come
to　be　dependent　on　the　base　that　supPorts　financially　your　activities，　the
more　you　become　vulnerable　to　its　loss．　The　diversi盒catioll　of盒nancial
bases孟s　a　degree　to　which　a　political　actor　can　spread　its　financial　bases
so　that　the　loss　of　a　single　financial　base　does　not　critically　hurt　the
actor．
　　Acommu蕪ist　party　has　at　least　one　rather　relatively　reliable且nancia1
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base：the　USSR．　Furthermore，　a　communist　party　in　China　or　South・
east　Asia　bases　its　financia1　source　on　many　villages　in　a　large　terr童tory．
In　co且trast，　a　non－communist　govemment　does　not　riecessarily　have
reliable　fbreign　resources．　Europe　and　the　US　do　help　non－commun重st
govemments，　but　they　are　not　reliable　because　once　they　perceive　that
their　assistance　is　not　producing　favorable　results，　they　abruptly　with－
draw　their　assistance．　The　government　has　cities　as　financ童al　bases．　But
asingle　battle　can　destroy　a　city．
　　Befbre　1949，　the　CCP’s　financial　resources　were　sma皿but　diversi丘ed．
In　contrast，　the　KMT’s且nancial　resources　were　large　but　concentrated．
The　KMT　tended　to　rely　on　a　limited　number　of　friends　such　as　the
compradores　in　Shaロghai　and　US　aid．　Without　this　diversincation，　a
political　actor　tellds　to　be　constrai簸ed　by　its　financial　supporters．　For
example，孟f　Chilla血ghts　a　war，　Ch孟nese　coastal　cities　are　very　vulnera－
ble．　The　KMT　cannot　launch　a　war　against　Japan，　so　long　as　the　KMT
depends　on　the　support　of　the　Shanghai　business　commun童ty．
3．　Questions　for　Political　Actors
　　Political　actors　must　always　consider　two　points．　First，　because　no
polit壼cal　actor　is　overwhelmingly　stronger　than　an　the　rest　combined，
actors　must　ask　themselves．　Who且ghts　whom？Whom　should　I　fbm
an　alliance　with　first，　How　long　will　the　alliance　last？
　　Seco1｝d，　because　the　process　of　nation－building　involves　both　the
elimination　and　the　assimilation　of　various　actors，　or　the　politicization
of　the　previously　apathetic，　a　political　actor　must　be　aware　that　its　own
organizational　structure　may　change　ill　dle　process　of　power　strug91e．
For　example，　a　large　membership　is　likely　to　weaken　the　cohesion　of　a
group．　If　an　organization　expands，　its　leader　must　begin　to　th藍nk　of　the
timing　of　indoctrination　and　purge．　In　addition，　duri簸g　a　civil　war　or
an　intemational　war，　a　political　actor’s血nanc童al　base　could　change
rather　quickly．　It　was　fatal，　for　example，　that　the　KMT　relied　on
Shanghai　business，　as　Shanghai　was　attacked　by　Japan　after　the
Mukden　Incident　and　the　China　hcident．
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V．Problem
●
1
　　It　is　important　to　study　the　causal　relations　between　the　strategies　of
poHtical　actors　in　a　process　of　nation－building　and　the　probability　of　a
communist　revolutio11．　On　a　theoretical　Ieve1，　what　are　the　relations
between　a　strategy　and　a　revolution？
　　There　are　at　Ieast　two　distinct　schools　in　revolution　theodes：structu－
ra1－determinist　schoo韮．and　actor－oriented　schoo1．　　Scholars　i簸　the
former　tend　to　see　revolution　as　a　result　of　socio－economic　conditions，
For　example，　Barrington　Moore3　explains　a　communist　revolution　as　a
result　of　the　absence　of　tlle　commerciaHzation　of　agriculture．　In
contrast，　actor－o丘ented　school　stresses　that　leadership　makes　a　big
difference．
　　Structura1－determinism　is　misleading．　Simply　both　strategies　and
cond量tions　matter，　and　the　key　question　is　the　relations　between　the
two．　There　are　three　mutuany　compatible　relations．
　　First，　conditiolls　constrain　choices．　For　example，　the　CCP　could烈ot
expect　the　poor　and　i撮terate　peasants　to　launch　voluntar逓y　a　coordin－
ated　civ皿war　aga三nst　the　KMT．　S㏄ond，　political　actors　change
conditions．　Some　cond孟tions　are　easy　to　change；others　are　not．　For
example，　it　was　dimcult　fbr　ally　political　actor　to　conduct　an　effective
land　reform　in　China．　But　it　was　easy　fbr　some　actors　to　provoke　the
Kwantullg　Amly　illto　a　fU11－scale　Sino－Japallese　war．　Third，　o切㏄tive
co盤dit孟ons　af『ect　the　perceptioll　of　pohtical　actors．　As　a　result，　a
pohtical　actor　perceives　that　one　strategy　is　possible　when　it　in　fact　is
not．　Or　a　political　actor　cannot　think　of　an　option　when　it　is　actually
open　to　the　poht孟cal　actor．　For　example，　because　of　the　success　of　the
Bolshevik　Revolution　in　Russia　and　tlle　atmosphere　of　the　Comintem
dudng　the　1920s，　Li　Li－san　a繊d　his　foilowers　may　have　misperceived
that　an　urban　updsing　would　be　feasible　in　China．
　　This　problem　of　perception　is　theoretically　very　complex　b㏄ause　all
o切㏄tive　co∬dition　may　be　sometimes　related　to　the　way　the　Ieaders　of
apolitical　organ三zation　are　selected．　Namely，　under　a　certain　o切ective
　3・Barrington　Moore，　Secial　ori°9in　of　Dictatorship　and　Demecracy
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conditio11，0nly　a　type　of　people　w孟th　a　specific　cognitive　characteristics
are　chosen　as　leaders．
　　Moreover，　a　political　actor　somet㎞es　realizes　the　most　feasible
optio∬simply　througll　trying　many　options．　An　example　may　be　China．
Barrington　Moore　connects　communism　with　agrarian　grievances．　But
actually　the　CCP　did　not　choose　at　first　the　strategy　of　peasant－
mobilization．It　was　only　after　surviving　the　failures　of　Li　Li－san　line
that　the　CCP　begall　to　fbcus　primarily　on　agrarian　power　bases．　For
i蹴舳e且cing　peasants，　the　Red　Army　was　essentia1．　But　tlle　Red　Army
was　created　only　after　tlle　Ap】d112　coup　of　1927．
　　Apolitical　orgallization　is　more　likely　to　succeed　when　it　can　choose
imlovative　strategies．　But　what　attributes　of　a　pOliticai　organization
make　imlovatioll　possible　remains　a　question．　On　some　occasions，
simply　the　failure　of　past　strategies　leads　to　the　innovation　of　strategy．
However，　democratic　centralism　will　be　more£avorable　to　innovation
than　an　organization　led　by　an　autocrat．
●
2
　　It　wil1　be　ideal　if　one　can　theorize　the　poi11t　of　no　ret㎜，　i．e．，　an　event
that　indicates　that　a　revolution　wi豆occur　in　the　near血ture．　One　may
be　able　to　say，　relying　on　the　experiences　of　the　emergence　of　the　CCP’s
China，　Communist　Vietnam，　and　Khmer　Rouge’s　Calnbodia，　that　ill　a
nation－bunding　non－communist　Third　Wor蓋d，　a　communist　revolution
is　very　Iikely　to　occur　after　a　civil　war　in　wh三ch　fbreign　coulltdes　are
mihtadly　involved．　There　were　communist　moveme且ts　and　even　civil
wars　in　other　Asian　countries　such　as　Illdonesia，　the　Philippines　and
Malaysia。　But　it　seems　that　the　success　of　a　commu皿ist　revolution三s
related　to　fbreign　intervention．　It　is　whell　the　process　of　contention
between　a　non・communist　government　and　a　communist　party　is　inter・
rupted　by　intervention　that　an　Asian　Third　World　country　has　commu－
niSt　reVOIUtiOnS．
　　When　a　fbreign　country血ghts　in　a　Third　World　country，　it　is
relatively　easy　fbr　a　communist　party　to　camoufiage　its　ideology　by
nationalistic　appeal　to　the　masses．　Communists　su㏄eed　ill　power
struggle　by　not　appead丑g　to　be　true　commu蹴ists．　It　is　a藍so　re藍atively
easy　fbr　a　communist　party　to　use　the　propaganda　of‘‘guilt　by　associa一
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tion”．　By　relating　a　non－communist　govemment　with　the　negative
image　of　an　intervening　fbreign　country，　a　communist　party　gains　much
broader　support．　In　this　sense，　I　see　as　correct　Chalmers　Johnson’s
thes量s　that　a　communist　revolution　in　China　is　a　result　of　peasallt
nationalism　aroused　by　Japan．4
　　1f　the　above　hypothesis　is　correct，　a　non－communist　govemment
competing　with　a　communist　party　has　two　strategies　available：（i）If　a
fbreign　military　operation　inside　your　country　is　likely，　do　not　compete
with　communists．（ii）　If　you　are　already　at　war　w孟th　a　communist
party，　do　your　best　to　avoid　fighting　with　a　fbreign　country．　Because，
in　both（i）and（ii），　if　you血ght　with　a　commullist　party　and　a　fbreign
invader　at　the　same　time，　the　communist　party　is　likely　to　be　the
ultimate　victor．　The　strategy　of　a　communist　party　is　the　opposite．
　　Clliang　Kai－shek’s　strategy　befbre　the　Sian　incident　is　in　accordance
with　the　above．　He　avoided最ght三ng　with　Japan，　because　be　was　waging
awar　against　the　CCP．　As　llis　order　of　non－resistance　after　the
Mukden　incident　of　1931　and　the　appeal　to　the正eague　of　Nationes
shows，　Chiang　may　have　believed　that　he　could　avoid　fighting　with
Japan．　For　Chiang，　to丘ght　against　the　CCP　without　confronting　Japan
was　a　much　more　rational　strategy　than　to　terminate　fight量ng　with　the
CCP　and　fight　against　Japan．　This　is　not　only　due　to　the　gap　of　military
power　between　Japan　alld　China　but　because　Chiang　can　control　over
the　KMT－CCP　struggle．　If　the　KMT且ghts　Japan，　supposing　that　the
CCP　wm　cooperate　with　the　KMT，　then　the　CCP　is　able　to　totally
change　the　situation　to　its　favor　by　waging　a　war　against　the　KMT．
　　Then，　if　the　KMT　continues　to　avoid血ghting　with　Japan，　what　will
be　the　strategy　of　the　CCP？　It　is　to　create　a　situation　in　wh壼ch　t｝ke
KMT　and　the　Chinese　people　are　compelled　to　fight　with　Japan．　That
the　CCP　realized　this　option　and　successfUny　put三nto　practice　this
option　demonstrates　the　genius　of　the　CCP　leadership．
VI．　Chilla
　　The　CCP　was　created　under　the　guidance　of　the　USSR．　The　KMT
also　relied　on　assistance　from　the　USSR．　In　retum　fbr　Soviet　aid，　the
　4，　Chalmers　Johllso級，　Pθα3α配蜘！’oπα1f3〃富and　Co〃lmunis’Reッolution‘πCゐ’ηα
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KMT　agreed　that　the　members　of　the　CCP　join　the　KMT．　But　as　it　was
evident　to　the　KMT　that　the　USSR’s　aid　to　the　KMT　was　simply　to
‘‘唐曹浮??嘯?hthe　party　eve飢uaUy，　Chiang　began　to　supPress　Soviet　advis－
ers　alld　communists．　After　the　coup　of　Apd112，1927，　Chiang　comes
to　have　virtual　control　over　KMT　leadership．
　　The　KMT，s　Northem　Expedit量o丑was　quick．　It　was　too　quick，
b㏄ause　it　was　soon　fbUowed　by　the　KMT，s　intemal　con伍ct．　After
defeating　the　rebels，　Ch三ang　begins　annihilation　campaigns．　The　CCP’s
Li　H－san　line　of　urban　uprising　did　not　bri双g　much　result　to　the　CCP．
As　a　result　of　the餓h　annihilation　campaign，　the　KMT　considerably
weakened　the　CCP，　but　could　not　defbat　it．　During　the　Long　March
that　fbllowed，　Mao’s　line　of　peasant　mobi頚zation　was　chosen　as　a　new
CCP　line．
　　Meanwhile，　the　Kwantung　Amy　invaded　China　in　1931　to　create　a
puppet　state　in　Manchuria　and　was　trying　to　establish　other　similar
puppet　govemments　in　North　China．　Chiang　caref岨y　avoided　direct
confrontation　with　Japan　after　the　Mukde龍incident，　by　giving　s㏄ret
order　of　nonresistance　to　Chang　Hsueh－liang　in　Manchuria．　But　this
strategically　wise　policy　alienated　nationalistic　urban　dwellers．
　　During　the　sixth　annihilation　campaign，　the　Sian　incident　occurred．
After　this　incident，　the　civ…1　waf　stopped．　Then　came　the　Ch蚤na
incident　of　July　7，1937，　which　led　to　a　full－scale　war　between　China
　5．Mao，s　secret　directives　to　the　E孟ghth　Route　Amy　du血g　this　pedod　are　quoted　ill
BdaLn　C「ozie「，11he”伽陥o　Lostα加α（p．237）
　“The　Si躯o－Japanese　War　affords　our　party　an　excellent　oppOrtunity　for　expansion．　Our
最xed　policy　Should　be　70　percent　expansion，20　percent　dealing　with　the　Kuomintang，　and
10percent　resisti皿g　Japan．　Tllere　are　thr㏄s臓ges　in　carrying　out　this且xed　policy．
　The丘rst　is　a　compromising　stage，　in　which　self－sacrifice　should　be　made　to　show　our
outward　obedience　to　the　Centmi　Govemme鳳t　and　adherence　to　the　Thr㏄People’s
principles；but　in　reality雌s　wiU　serve　as　camou且age　fbr　tlle　existe韮ce　a鰍d　development
of　our　paれy．
　The　seco鞭d　is　a　contending　stage，孟n　which　two　or　three　years　shoUld　be　spent　in　laying
the　fbundations　of　our　party’s　political　and　m董1itary　powers，　and　develop血g　the8e　until　we
can磁atch　and　break　the　Kuomintang，　and　e㎞i皿ate　the　i駄且uence　of　the　latter　North　of
Yeliow　River．
　The　third　is　an　offensive　stage，　in　which　our　forces　shouid　penetrate　deeply　into　Central
China，　sever　the　communications　of　the　Central　G。verament　troops　in　v蜘繊o恩，
isolate　alld　dispefse　the搬until　we　are　ready　fbr　theσounter－offensive，　and　wrest　tlle
leadership　from　the　hands　of　Kuomintang．”
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a皿dJapan．　The　KMT　and　the　CCP　formed　the　Second　United　front．
The　KMT’s　m孟1itary　power　was　quickly　diminished　by　Japan．　Trading
space　fbr　time，　the　KMT　sought　cease一丘re，　without　success．　Mean－
while，　the　CCP　launched　a　war　of　attrition　against　Japa皿．　Japall　was
involved　in　a　hopeless　war．　The　bmtality　of　the　Japanese　gave　birth　to
Chinese　peasant　nationahsm．　Organizing　these　peasants，　practicing
land　ref（）rm　but　compromising　with　wealthy　farmers，　the　CCP　ex－
panded　its　infiuence．5
　　Losing　its　most　important且nancial　base　in　Shanghai　as　a　result　of
bombing，　the　KMT　became　increasingly　dependent　on　US　a三d．　After
Pearl　Harbor，　the　US　was　able　to　aid　the　KMT　publicly．　The　CCP
meanwhile　was　creating　an孟mage　of‘‘moderate　agrarian　reformers”in
the　US．
　　Colltemporary　theoretical　literature　on　revolution　is　not　very　helpful
in　explaining　the　revolutions　of　China　or　Southeast　Asia．　In　Europe，
there　is　only　a　short　intemission　between　the　destruction　of　the　old
regime　and　the　creation　of　a　new　regime．　However，童n　Chinese　and
Southeast　Asian　cases，　it　is　more　reasonable　to　separate　the　causes　of
destruction　of　old　regimes　and　the　causes　of　the　creation　of　new
regimes．　When　the　old　regime　collapses，　it　is　not　necessarily　clear　what
kind　of　regime　wi皿eventually　emerge．　But　theoretical　literature　on
revolutions，　especially　structural　determinism　and　economic　determin－
ism，　tends　to　explain　the　creation　of　the　new　in　temls　of　the　causes　of
the　coilapse　of　the　old　regimes，　such　as　peasant　grievances．　Between　the
old　and　the　new　there　is　uncertainty．
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